The main source of authority for the federal regulation of interstate and international commerce is the commerce clause . This clause is established in Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution. The Article grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Thus, the commerce clause serves to simultaneously empower the federal government, while limiting state power.
So long as a federal regulation impacts interstate commerce, that regulation can be described as constitutional, according to the commerce clause. However, since the Constitution was first written, there have often been occasions when the judiciary system has needed to step in to interpret the meaning and implications of the commerce clause. In particular, there have been disputes over the intended meaning of the phrase “among the several States.” Up until the 1930s, this phrase was interpreted in a literal way, so that activities subject to federal regulation were required to involve trade between the states. This strict interpretation actually served to limit the federal regulation of commerce.
The turning point in the interpretation of the commerce clause came with the 1937 case, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp . The previous year, in the Carter v. Carter Coal Co case, the court invalidated a program, initiated under the New Deal, that had tried to regulate the labor practices of coal firms on the basis that these practices were local, and therefore had only an indirect impact on interstate commerce. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp , the court deviated from that decision by ruling that Congress could regulate employment practices at a steel plant because any stoppages at that plant would have a serious, detrimental impact on interstate commerce. The court concluded that since the steel industry is a networked industry that incorporates mines, plants, and factories from Minnesota to Pennsylvania, the manufacturing of steel properly falls under the jurisdiction of the commerce clause. In summing up, the court concluded that:
“Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens or obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control” (NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 1937).
Ever since the NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp case, Congress has invoked the commerce clause to rule on a diverse range of business and commercial activities, as well as to support social reforms that indirectly impact state commerce. Examination of the United States Code reveals that there are more than 700 legislative provisions that explicitly refer to foreign or interstate commerce. What is perhaps most remarkable is the sheer diversity of statutory areas covered by the commerce clause. Areas covered include the regulation of sporting activities, endangered species, energy regulation, gambling, firearms control, and even terrorism.
While businesses have often challenged these statutes as existing outside of the realm of congressional authority, in most cases, the courts have upheld the statutes as being valid exercises of congressional power in line with the commerce clause. An exception is the 1995 case, United States v. Lopez . The case centered around the legality of the Gun-Free School Zone Act, which was a federal law that outlawed the possession of guns within 1,000 feet of a school. In a landmark case, the Court ruled that the Act was outside the scope of the commerce clause, and that Congress did not have the authority to regulate in an area that had “nothing to do with commerce, or any sort of enterprise.”
A recent controversy pertaining to the commerce clause relates to the passing of the Affordable Care Act, as described earlier. Protestors claimed that the individual mandate aspect of the ACA should be treated as a regulation that affects interstate commerce. According to their argument, after the Act was implemented, there would be an increase in the sale and purchase of health care insurance, such that the market for health care should be seen as being significantly impacted by the Act. However, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Roberts, ruled that actions that create new business activity do not affect interstate commerce.
The authority of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce has, at times, come into conflict with state authority over the same area of regulation. The courts have tried to resolve these conflicts with reference to the police power of the states.
Police power refers to the residual powers granted to each state to safeguard the welfare of their inhabitants. Examples of areas in which states tend to exercise their police power are zoning regulations, building codes, and sanitation standards for eating places. However, there are times when the states’ use of police power impacts interstate commerce. If the exercise of the power interferes with, or discriminates against, interstate commerce, then the action is generally deemed to be unconstitutional. The limitation on the authority of states to regulate in areas that impact interstate commerce is known as the dormant commerce clause .
In using the dormant commerce clause to resolve conflicts between state and federal authority, the courts consider the extent to which the state law has a legitimate purpose. If it is determined that the state law has a legitimate purpose, then the court tries to determine whether the impact on interstate commerce is in the interest of the citizens of the state, and will rule accordingly. For instance, an ordinance that banned spray paint, issued in the city of Chicago, was challenged by paint manufacturers under the dormant commerce clause, but was ultimately upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals because the ban was intended to reduce graffiti and related crimes.
Today, Congress uses its authority to regulate commercial activity in four general areas relating to the commerce clause:
| Area of Regulation | Explanation | Examples |
| Regulation of the channels of interstate commerce | Channels of interstate commerce describe the passages of transportation between the states. Thus, the commerce clause authorizes Congress to regulate activities pertaining to the nation’s airways, waterways, and roadways, and even where the activity itself takes place entirely in a single state. | For example, Congress can pass regulations that restrict what can be carried on airlines or on ships. |
| Regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce | Instrumentalities of commerce are understood to be any resource employed in the carrying out of commerce. Examples of these resources are machines, equipment, vehicles, and personnel. Thus, Congress has the power to regulate these areas. | Congress could pass regulations mandating certain safety standards for equipment used in manufacturing plants. |
| Regulation of intangibles and tangibles that cross state lines | Any object, tangible or intangible, that crosses state lines can be regulated under the commerce clause. Tangible objects include goods purchased by consumers, as well as raw materials and equipment used in the production of goods for sale. Intangible objects include services, as well as electronic databases. | The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) regulates the sale of information contained in the Department of Motor Vehicles’ (DMV’s) records. |
| Regulation of activities that are deemed to have a substantial impact on interstate commerce | Federal regulation of economic commercial activity expected to have a significant (as opposed to minor) effect on interstate commerce is constitutional, according to the commerce clause. Noneconomic commercial activity is not covered. | The courts in the United States vs. Lopez case described earlier deemed the Act to be unconstitutional because its terms have “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise.” |
